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are predicted to be adaptive on average outside the laboratory;
for example, if being nice invites reciprocation. People bring
these psychological mechanisms with them into the laboratory,
where the behaviour produced may or may not still be adaptive
on average (Barclay, 2011; West et al. 2011). “Maladaptive” be-
haviour can persist despite repeated anonymous encounters, as
long as the same proximate psychological mechanisms are repeat-
edly triggered (e.g., anger, desire for fairness, empathy).
However, this would say little about the ultimate function that
those mechanisms serve outside the laboratory. Too much ink
has been spilled by researchers who do not realize that their col-
leagues are simply addressing a different level of analysis.
On a completely different note, Guala makes a useful distinc-
tion between wide and narrow readings of the experimental evi-
dence, and what each reading implies. Wide interpretations can
clearly be taken too far: If punishment (or any other phenom-
enon) supports cooperation in the lab, it does not necessarily
mean that this is what supports it outside the lab. However,
I would caution against hasty abandonment of such wide
interpretations. Sometimes laboratory experiments use controlled
conditions to test whether a proposed mechanism could support
punishment. At other times, such experiments test the validity
of theories of human behaviour (Mook 1983): If a predicted
phenomenon cannot be found in the lab under ideal controlled
conditions, then we must either reject or revise any theory that
relies on that phenomenon (see, e.g., the lack of punishment
towards non-punishers in Kiyonari & Barclay 2008). If successful,
do these findings need confirmatory non-laboratory observations
with real-world phenomena? Absolutely. Convergent evidence is
crucial in all scientific enterprises, and the laboratory and the
field have their own respective strengths and weaknesses. As
such, we should all strongly support the call for collaborations
across disciplines and between the lab and the field. Guala’s
target article has clearly shown that the punishment literature
needs more of this, and for that it should be commended.
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Abstract: Strong reciprocity theorists claim that punishment has evolved
to promote the good of the group and to deter cheating. By contrast, weak
reciprocity suggests that punishment aims to restore justice (i.e.,
reciprocity) between the criminal and his victim. Experimental
evidences as well as field observations suggest that humans punish
criminals to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperation.
As Guala rightly notes, there is very little evidence that punish-
ment plays a role in the stabilization of cooperation in small-
scale societies. On the other hand, as he also notes, it is difficult
to totally rule out the strong view of punishment as it is compli-
cated to precisely assess the costs of punishment in the field (Are
there really no costs in punishing others? Aren’t there many
hidden benefits for the individual who punish? etc.). There is,
however, another way to disentangle the two views of punish-
ment, namely, the forms that punishments take. Indeed, the
two theories – the weak and the strong – make different predic-
tions regarding the logic of punishment.
Group selection theory holds that punishment aims to promote
the good of the group by sustaining cooperation and preventing
cheating (Boyd et al. 2003; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Henrich &
Boyd 2001). This implies that punishment should be calibrated
to deter crimes and render them non-advantageous. Here,
group selection parallels the utilitarian doctrine of punishment,
which contends that punishment should be used to deter
crimes and maximize the good of society (Polinsky & Shavell
2000; Posner 1983). The utilitarian theory of punishment holds,
for instance, that the detection rate of a given crime and the pub-
licity associated with a given conviction are relevant factors in
assigning punishments. If a crime is difficult to detect, the pun-
ishment for that crime ought to be made more severe in order
to counterbalance the temptation created by the low risk of
getting caught. Likewise, if a conviction is likely to get a lot of
publicity, a law enforcement system interested in deterrence
should take advantage of this circumstance by “making an
example” of the convict with a particularly severe punishment,
thus getting a maximum of deterrence for its punishment.
By contrast, individual selection predicts a “restorative” or
“retributive” logic for punishment (Baumard 2011). Restorative
logic holds that punishment aims to restore justice between the
criminal and the victim – either by harming the criminal or by
compensating the victim. In intuitive terms, people are punished
because they “deserve” to be punished, and not because punish-
ing them would be useful for the society at large.
This restorative logic is a direct consequence of the way
cooperation has evolved among humans (Baumard 2010a;
Trivers 1971). Indeed, human beings belong to a highly coopera-
tive species and get most of their resources from collective actions,
solidarity, exchanges, and so forth. (Gurven 2004; Hill & Kaplan
1999). In the ancestral environment, individuals were in compe-
tition to be recruited for the most fruitful ventures, and it was
vital to share the benefits of cooperation in a mutually advan-
tageous manner. If individuals took a bigger share of the benefits,
their partners would leave them for more interesting partners. If
they took a smaller share, they would be exploited by their partners
who would receive more than what they had contributed to
produce. This competition to attract cooperative partners is thus
likely to have led to selection for a “sense of fairness,” a cognitive
device that motivates individuals to share the costs and benefits of
social interaction in an impartial way (André & Baumard 2011). If
cooperation is based on fairness, then crimes create an unfair
relationship between the criminal and her victim, and people
have the intuition that the criminal ought to compensate the
victim or to be punished in order to restore justice.
It is worth mentioning that this theory does not mean that pun-
ishment should be absent in human societies. As Guala notes,
modern societies have found many institutional ways to reduce
the costs of punishments. Although these institutions are
absent in smaller societies, justice can still be restored by individ-
uals seeking to retaliate. Retaliation is indeed advantageous from
an individual perspective and can indeed be found in many
nonhuman species (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). As Evans-
Pritchard noted, in societies where there is no penal system,
“self-help, with some backing of public opinion, is the main
sanction” (Evans-Pritchard 1940/1969, p. 169).
In this kind of situations, selfish and moral motives converge:
The victim (or his allies) attacks the criminal to signal his strength
and gains a reputation as someone who cannot be attacked
without risk; and by doing so, he also punishes the wrongdoer
by allowing justice to be done. In line with this idea, people in
small-scale societies distinguish between legitimate (and propor-
tionate) retaliation and illegitimate (and disproportionate) reta-
liation (von Fürer-Hameindorf 1967; Miller 1990). Retaliation
is thus clearly limited by moral concerns: within the group, it
has to be proportionate to the prejudice. As the Lex Talionis
says, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,” but no more.
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Individual selection thus clearly predicts some kind of punish-
ment, and, more importantly, it predicts that punishments should
aim toward a specific goal (restoring fairness) that differs from
the utilitarian goal predicted by group selection (preventing
wrongdoing). Experimental studies, relying on a variety of meth-
odologies, suggest that punishments fit individual selection more
than group selection. Indeed, when people punish harmdoers,
they generally respond to factors relevant to a retributive
theory of punishment (magnitude of harm, moral intentions)
and ignore factors relevant to the group selection theory (likeli-
hood of detection, publicity, likelihood of repeat offending)
(Baron et al. 1993; Baron & Ritov 2008; Carlsmith et al. 2002;
Darley et al. 2000; Glaeser & Sacerdote 2000; Sunstein et al.
2000).
In line with these results, field observations have extensively
demonstrated that, in keeping with the prediction, the level of
compensation in stateless societies is directly proportional to
the prejudice inflicted to the victim: For example, the wrongdoer
owes more to the victim if the wrongdoer has killed a family
member or eloped with a wife than if he has stolen animals or
destroyed crops (Hoebel 1954; Howell 1954; Malinowski 1926).
To conclude, punishment does not seem to be a group adap-
tation. It follows the logic of fairness rather than the interests
of the group.
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Abstract: Guala points to a discrepancy between strong negative
reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained “in
the wild.” This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong
negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the
players’ actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a
limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain
environment.
Strong reciprocity is the behavioral predisposition to cooperate
conditionally on others’ cooperation and to punish violations of
cooperative norms even at a net cost to the punisher (Fehr &
Gintis 2007). The phenomenon has been the subject of consider-
able research in the last few decades (e.g., Camerer 2003; Fehr &
Gächter 2000b; Rabin 1993), and its existence is well established.
In the target article, Guala points to a discrepancy between the
strong negative reciprocity that is observed in the lab and the way
cooperation is sustained “in the wild.” Specifically, he suggests
that there is no indication for costly punishment in the wild.
This claim gives rise to the question as to what extent one can
predict actual behavior in real-life situations from behavior in
the very artificial and contrived laboratory setting. The author
suggests that behavior in the laboratory with respect to strong
negative reciprocity does not really reflect behavior in real life.
However, the matter may actually be somewhat more complex
than it seems. Even if there is no strong negative reciprocity in
the real world, this may still be in line with the results from lab-
oratory studies. One simply has to make sure that the laboratory
studies capture crucial characteristics of the real world.
One of the main properties of real-world situations is some
degree of uncertainty (which does not usually exist in laboratory
studies and particularly in those the author referred to). In many
real-life social dilemmas people face uncertainty of two types: (1)
environmental uncertainty, which is uncertainty regarding
aspects of the dilemma (e.g., the size of the common resource);
and (2) social uncertainty, which is uncertainty regarding the
other group members’ choices (Messick et al. 1998). Moreover,
outcomes may be determined probabilistically.
For negative reciprocity to occur, accurate knowledge regard-
ing the actions and the intentions of the players is important. If
uncertainty exists, it will be difficult to determine whether the
action and the outcome were the result of violations of coopera-
tive norms. While most laboratory experiments have dealt with
situations that are certain, a number of studies have introduced
some degree of uncertainty into situations in which negative reci-
procity is possible. These studies consistently show that uncer-
tainty lowers the tendency towards negative reciprocity.
Most of the evidence for strong negative reciprocity was
observed in the Ultimatum Game (UG). In research on the
UG, responders are very likely to reject offers that are less than
30% of the cake (e.g., Güth et al. 1982). By rejecting the offer,
the responder gives up a possible gain; and thus the finding is
interpreted as evidence for responders’ willingness to pay a
cost to punish the proposers they perceive as acting unfairly,
even if they will never meet the proposers again. In the classic
experiment and in most following ones, the size of the pie to
be divided is common knowledge. As was noted by Croson
(1996), this assumption is unrealistic.
Several experiments investigated UGs with one-sided uncer-
tainty on the part of the responder. Typically, in these exper-
iments proposers know the exact amount of money to be
divided, and responders either know nothing at all or know the
probability distribution of possible amounts.
In most studies responders accepted lower offers when they
did not know the size of the pie and when the lack of information
was common knowledge. Proposers, in turn, did not hesitate to
exploit this behavior and offered little when the amount to
divide was large (e.g., Croson 1996; Mitzkewitz & Nagel 1993;
Rapoport et al. 1996). Recently Gehrig et al. (2007) studied a
UG with a different source of uncertainty. In their game the
responder knows the pie size but not the offer when deciding
whether to accept or reject (i.e., has imperfect information).
Responders never reject in this game, even when they anticipate
low offers.
Under both types of uncertainty responders seem to give pro-
posers the benefit of the doubt: Because a low offer could be fair
if the pie is small or the yet-unknown offer could eventually be
fair, rejecting the offer would mean punishing the proposer
unfairly. Consequently, with uncertainty lower offers are more
likely to be accepted. This behavior is strong evidence that rejec-
tions in the UG are an expression of preference when responders
do know the proposer’s payoff (Camerer 2003); and therefore the
ability to generalize these preferences to situations with uncer-
tainty is limited.
Uncertainty also affects reciprocity in repeated interactions.
The ability of reciprocity to sustain cooperation in the long run,
and specifically in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, was demon-
strated by Axelrod’s (1984) well-known computer tournaments.
Later it has been shown that cooperation is much more difficult
to maintain if there is uncertainty regarding players’ actions, that
is, if there is random error either in choosing actions or in moni-
toring others’ actions (see, e.g., Axelrod & Dion 1988; Bendor
1993; Green & Porter 1984; Sainty 1999). That is, if actions are
noisy, a player does not know whether another player’s defection
was an error or an intended choice, and strategies involving reci-
procation (e.g., tit for tat) can break down. But even if players can
monitor others’ past actions perfectly in a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, if payoffs are noisy, players learn to cooperate
much less (e.g., Bereby-Meyer & Roth 2006; Kunreuther et al.
2009).
Hence, the fact that Guala in his analysis of real-world situ-
ations did not find evidence for strong negative reciprocity
does not necessarily imply that results from laboratory studies
cannot predict reciprocity behavior in the real world. Instead,
one can perhaps conclude that in situations with uncertainty,
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